Laaltain

Understanding Negotiation as a Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Are We Ready to Talk to the TTP?

4 اکتوبر، 2013

Zoha Waseem

Are-We-Ready-to-Talk

Upon ini­tial read­ings of lit­er­a­ture in favour of talk­ing to ter­ror­ists, sev­er­al rather appeal­ing ele­ments stand out con­cep­tu­al­ly. There is the moral ele­ment: might does not make right. There is the human­i­tar­i­an ele­ment: vio­lence breeds griev­ances that breed fur­ther vio­lence. There is prece­dence: the IRA mod­el is an exam­ple of suc­cess­ful nego­ti­a­tions. There are even illog­i­cal com­par­isons: if we can talk with our arch­en­e­my India, why not with the Tal­iban.

While much has been writ­ten about why talks are nec­es­sary, the when, how, and with whom aspects of this process are equal­ly impor­tant. As such, this arti­cle aims to high­light the lit­er­ary dis­cours­es per­tain­ing to nego­ti­at­ing with ter­ror­ists and how they pro­vide a deep­er under­stand­ing into a process that our lead­ers and pol­i­cy mak­ers are seek­ing to pur­sue. It will also be argued why cer­tain case stud­ies (i.e. IRA, LTTE) may not pro­vide the best mod­els in con­text with Pakistan’s strate­gies against the TTP.

Aca­d­e­mics dif­fer­en­ti­ate between absolute ter­ror­ism as a tac­tic in which vio­lence becomes a form of self-real­i­sa­tion, where the aims and objec­tives are nihilis­tic or mil­len­ni­al­ist, and tra­di­tion­al ter­ror­ism where vio­lence is utilised for polit­i­cal or eco­nom­ic aspi­ra­tions.

Advan­tages of Nego­ti­a­tions

William Zart­man, a pro­fes­sor at Johns Hop­kins Uni­ver­si­ty, and Guy Olivi­er Fau­re, a French pro­fes­sor, co-wrote ‘Why Engage and Why Not?’ in the book Engag­ing Extrem­ists where they argued the pros and cons of nego­ti­at­ing with ter­ror­ists. ‘Nego­ti­a­tion is the art of com­pro­mise’, they philosophised. The ben­e­fits of engag­ing ter­ror­ist organ­i­sa­tions, through peace talks, are mul­ti­ple. First, the nego­tia­tor is in a place to gain infor­ma­tion about what the ter­ror­ist group is real­ly demand­ing – the ‘back chan­nels’ pro­vide means of gath­er­ing intel­li­gence on the group that is not nec­es­sar­i­ly revealed by media rep­re­sen­ta­tives. If the stronger nego­tia­tor acts cre­ative­ly, it can even influ­ence the deci­sion of the oth­er par­ty. Nego­ti­at­ing is arguably the only viable alter­na­tive to vio­lence and can suc­cess­ful­ly end the ‘ter­ror­ism’ aspect of a con­flict.

Dis­ad­van­tages of Nego­ti­a­tions

That said, Zart­man is also one of the many aca­d­e­mics crit­ics who warn us about the chal­lenges asso­ci­at­ed with this strat­e­gy. ‘Engage­ment is a risky choice for both sides, which explains the reluc­tance to engage’, he writes with Fau­re. ‘To begin with, engage­ment and nego­ti­a­tion car­ry with them the recog­ni­tion of the ter­ror­ist orga­ni­za­tion (and, for the ter­ror­ists, the recog­ni­tion of the state). Recog­ni­tion con­fers a degree of legit­i­ma­cy and sta­tus, and an implaca­ble that the par­ty speaks for the client pop­u­la­tion it claims to rep­re­sent’.
For the state, it is cru­cial to engage only when some ini­tial pay­ment or guar­an­tee has been received, oth­er­wise there is an unavoid­able like­li­hood of the state’s posi­tion weak­en­ing and terrorist’s strength­en­ing once the latter’s posi­tion is recog­nised. It essen­tial­ly means that a state is in a posi­tion to com­pro­mise its exclu­sive legit­i­ma­cy. This can pose a risk for fur­ther­ance of vio­lence if (a) the same group(s) decides to revert back to their ter­ror tac­tics, and/or (b) nego­ti­a­tion encour­ages oth­er mil­i­tant orga­ni­za­tions to resort to vio­lent ter­ror tac­tics under the impres­sion that the state will even­tu­al­ly cave into their demands.
Hayes, Kamin­sky and Beres of Evi­dence Based Research explain the con­cept of ‘absolute ter­ror­ism’, a new form of ter­ror­ism (or ‘new ter­ror­ism’ as Bruce Hoff­man describes it) that is more com­pli­cat­ed and dan­ger­ous than the tra­di­tion­al meth­ods of ter­ror­ism. ‘These groups are char­ac­terised as abso­lutist because they are not will­ing to enter into a polit­i­cal dis­course. Rather, their demands are imme­di­ate, uncon­di­tion­al, and uni­ver­sal’, sim­i­lar to those of the TTP who have turned down the offer of polit­i­cal par­tic­i­pa­tion (or office), reject­ed the Con­sti­tu­tion, and insist­ed upon the imple­men­ta­tion of their ver­sion of Sharia across the coun­try.
The dif­fer­ences between absolute ter­ror­ists and oth­ers lace the debate on dis­cus­sion, mak­ing sev­er­al aca­d­e­mics includ­ing Alan Der­showitz (a pro­fes­sor of law at Har­vard) main­tain that nego­ti­a­tions are always a bad idea and should only be con­sid­ered when ter­ror­ists are on the brink of defeat.

The Dilem­mas of When, How, and with Whom

Peter Neu­mann, a pro­fes­sor at King’s Col­lege Lon­don, writes that ‘the first and most obvi­ous ques­tion for any gov­ern­ment con­sid­er­ing nego­ti­a­tions is whether the ter­ror­ists it faces can make good nego­ti­at­ing part­ners’. Giv­en the evo­lu­tion of ter­ror­ism over the decades, this new ‘wave’ of reli­gious ter­ror­ism in the twen­ty-first cen­tu­ry means that the aims and ide­olo­gies of a ter­ror­ist organ­i­sa­tion must be con­sid­ered before deter­min­ing to what extent it will com­pro­mise.
Aca­d­e­mics dif­fer­en­ti­ate between absolute ter­ror­ism as a tac­tic in which vio­lence becomes a form of self-real­i­sa­tion, where the aims and objec­tives are nihilis­tic or mil­len­ni­al­ist, and tra­di­tion­al ter­ror­ism where vio­lence is utilised for polit­i­cal or eco­nom­ic aspi­ra­tions. For absolute ter­ror­ism, they main­tain that nego­ti­a­tions must take place when ter­ror­ists are on the verge of giv­ing up.
How­ev­er, warns Neu­mann, even when ter­ror­ists seem to be los­ing, gov­ern­ments must tread care­ful­ly. Refer­ring to a peace process in Colom­bia with FARC in the late 1990s, he reminds us that states overea­ger to begin nego­ti­a­tions could lose out ter­ri­bly. In 1998, as part of an ini­tial peace process, the Colom­bian gov­ern­ment agreed to pro­vide FARC with a demil­i­tarised zone where its mil­i­tants could oper­ate freely with­out hin­drances from secu­ri­ty forces, before the group gave any guar­an­tees of dis­con­tin­u­ing vio­lence. FARC grabbed the oppor­tu­ni­ty to go on an out­right offen­sive, abus­ing the indi­rect legit­i­ma­cy that had been pro­vid­ed to it by Bogo­ta. The mil­i­tary was even­tu­al­ly ordered to move in and reoc­cu­py the ter­ri­to­ry.
How­ev­er, aca­d­e­mics still do not clas­si­fy FARC as absolute ter­ror­ists. So far, al Qae­da and its affil­i­ates have been the only groups to fall under the cat­e­go­ry of absolute ter­ror­ism. The table below breaks down the three clas­si­fi­ca­tions to include the TTP.

Absolute Ter­ror­istsCon­di­tion­al Absolute Ter­ror­istsCon­tin­gent Ter­ror­ists
The use of ter­ror tac­tics is an end in itself, and their sole objec­tive is to cre­ate destruc­tion and vio­lence so as to achieve a par­tic­u­lar polit­i­cal aim. Accord­ing to Zart­man, it is impos­si­ble to nego­ti­ate with absolute ter­ror­ists but nego­ti­a­tions can be used to influ­ence the group or mem­bers with­in the group. Reli­gious ter­ror­ism (or what Rapoport calls the ‘fourth wave of ter­ror­ism’) could fall into this cat­e­go­ry. In this cat­e­go­ry, ter­ror­ists can con­sid­er them­selves as puri­fiers, seek­ing to rid a pop­u­lace of apos­tate rulers and non-believ­ers that may be taint­ing their belief sys­tems.

(e.g. Al Qae­da and its affil­i­ates, TTP)

They use ter­ror tac­tics (sui­cide attacks, guer­ril­la war­fare, etc.) but are open to nego­ti­a­tions because they usu­al­ly have some­thing to nego­ti­ate about, such as ter­ri­to­r­i­al inde­pen­dence or self-deter­mi­na­tion (also referred to as nation­al­ist ter­ror­ism, or — to be more polit­i­cal­ly cor­rect — insur­gen­cies). These groups are dif­fi­cult to engage, but not unen­gage­able.

(e.g. LTTE, IRA, FARC, PLO)

They use ter­ror tac­tics are a means to achieve oth­er goals; vio­lence is con­tin­gent on their demands being met and ends with nego­ti­a­tions and ful­fil­ment of their demands.

(e.g. kid­nap­pers, hostage tak­ers, rebels and/or rev­o­lu­tion­ar­ies)

Com­par­a­tive ‘Mod­els’ and Case Stud­ies

In the present sce­nario in Pak­istan, the TTP seems to be lay­ing down the con­di­tions. One spokesman went on record to say that if the gov­ern­ment cease­fires first, then the TTP would fol­low suit. They have not agreed to any demands made by the state but con­stant­ly pro­ject­ed their own; they thanked Imran Khan for his pro­pos­al that the TTP should open a polit­i­cal office, but main­tained they have no such desire to do so; they want their men to be released, while not promis­ing any rejec­tion of vio­lence on their behalf. Instead, Ehsan­ul­lah Ehsan recent­ly released a state­ment that because four TTP mem­bers had been killed in Karachi, the option of cease-fire with the apos­tate gov­ern­ment of Pak­istan was now off the table.
Ehsan’s state­ment was released the same day Imran Khan’s arti­cle was pub­lished in The News in which he referred to the inter­na­tion­al his­to­ry of nego­ti­at­ing with ter­ror­ists, name­ly LTTE, IRA, Viet Cong, and now the Afghan Tal­iban. Let’s briefly con­sid­er each case study.

The IRA Mod­el

If the IRA mod­el is to be applied to Pak­istan in any case, it should be done with the right inter­pre­ta­tion, and with the real­i­sa­tion that a demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­ern­ment, with strong insti­tu­tions, should not be led into a posi­tion where it should be bar­gain­ing its author­i­ty.

North­ern Ire­land faced one of the longest-run­ning con­flicts in mod­ern his­to­ry. Its so-called ‘suc­cess’ of peace process that led to the Good Fri­day Agree­ments between Britain and Sinn Fein (IRA’s polit­i­cal wing), became an ide­al mod­el for con­flict res­o­lu­tion around the world – espe­cial­ly eth­nic con­flicts. Eamonn O’Kane, while exam­in­ing the uses and abus­es of the Irish ‘mod­el’, explained how in the con­text of IRA, end­ing vio­lence was ‘a clear and con­sis­tent­ly applied pre­con­di­tion’ for Britain.
Spec­tor explained fur­ther. ‘In the British-Sinn Fein case, nego­ti­a­tion was not a deci­sion ini­ti­at­ed by the gov­ern­ment. It was a con­se­quence of cer­tain con­di­tions being met by the vil­lain…. The IRA-Sinn Fein, in fact, was forced to change its ways and tac­tics – to appear not to be a vil­lain any­more in a very pub­lic man­ner – before the gov­ern­ment was will­ing to accede to direct nego­ti­a­tions. Thus the vil­lain need to ‘dev­il­lainise’ itself. Once that rever­sal occurred, the British gov­ern­ment was shield­ed from the accu­sa­tion of appease­ment and agreed to nego­ti­a­tions’.
If the IRA mod­el is to be applied to Pak­istan in any case, it should be done with the right inter­pre­ta­tion, and with the real­i­sa­tion that a demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­ern­ment, with strong insti­tu­tions, should not be led into a posi­tion where it should be bar­gain­ing its author­i­ty.

The LTTE Mod­el

The down­fall of the Tamil Tigers is anoth­er mis­un­der­stood mod­el that Pak­istani ana­lysts love men­tion­ing. It was not peace talks that brought down the LTTE. Rather, the LTTE used peace time to regroup and strength­en itself. Essen­tial­ly, they used cease­fire agree­ments to buy time for more vio­lence.
Before LTTE’s col­lapse, Dr Ravni Thakur, a pro­fes­sor at Del­hi Uni­ver­si­ty, stat­ed, ‘For [India], the LTTE is and will remain a ter­ror­ist organ­i­sa­tion, and the Indi­an civ­il soci­ety will not help or cre­ate a sit­u­a­tion which might allow the LTTE to take advan­tage. Absolute­ly not. We do not talk to the LTTE’. She added that talks with the LTTE would require the pre­con­di­tion of LTTE renounc­ing vio­lence.
What the LTTE mod­el does pro­vide the world is an extreme­ly bit­ter exam­ple. The LTTE did not lose to the Sin­halese gov­ern­ment due to nego­ti­a­tions. There was a polit­i­cal will to elim­i­nate the LTTE and its lead­er­ship; new mil­i­tary plans were devised to defeat the group mil­i­tar­i­ly; defence bud­gets were allo­cat­ed to ensure that only the best equip­ment was used in rout­ing out the tigers. Addi­tion­al­ly, the Sri Lankan army trained itself in the one tac­tic the Tigers had cham­pi­oned: guer­ril­la war­fare.
Was it effec­tive? Yes. Was it clean? No. Thou­sands of inno­cent lives were lost in the process. Human shields and child sol­diers were noto­ri­ous­ly utilised by both sides. The Tigers were even­tu­al­ly side-lined on the inter­na­tion­al front, with aid and sup­port fil­ter­ing in for the Sin­halese gov­ern­ment. Tamil his­to­ry was for­ev­er taint­ed. What start­ed as a sep­a­ratist insur­gency (con­tin­gent ter­ror­ism) soon evolved into an out­right ter­ror­ist organ­i­sa­tion (con­di­tion­al absolute ter­ror­ism) that vio­lat­ed cease­fire agree­ments on count­less occa­sions only to final­ly admit defeat in 2009.

The Viet Cong Com­par­i­son

Anoth­er bad com­par­i­son. US peace talks with the Viet Cong came at a time when the for­mer realised it was fight­ing a los­ing war. Sev­en­ty per cent of peo­ple killed in the Viet­nam War were civil­ians. Pub­lic sup­port was dimin­ish­ing by the day. The US was at the brink of an embar­rass­ing exit when they pro­posed nego­ti­a­tions. It was, at best, a face-sav­ing mea­sure.

The Afghan Tal­iban Mod­el

Inter­est­ing­ly, Khan again referred to his least favourite nation in the world by way of com­par­i­son. Nego­ti­at­ing with the Tal­iban in Afghanistan is some­thing the US needs (refer to Viet Cong mod­el). Twelve years of bat­tling and dron­ing it out in Afghanistan has left them with lit­tle oth­er options. Dia­logue, at this point, is a propo­si­tion made by a state that wants to pull out at all costs and leave behind a grand ges­ture of an idea that they brought ‘peace’ in bat­tle-rid­den coun­try.

Con­clu­sion

Pak­istan must under­stand TTP as the weak­er adver­sary and the ene­my, not a par­ty it can bar­gain with; it first needs to bring the ter­ror­ists groups respon­si­ble for vio­lence in a place that leaves them with no option but to nego­ti­ate and abide by the options that the state choses to pro­vide them with.

Pak­istan will need to take a mul­ti-pronged approach, all the while main­tain­ing its demo­c­ra­t­ic prin­ci­ples. It must be the decid­ing par­ty that lays down its demands and accepts noth­ing short of a com­plete rejec­tion of vio­lence from the TTP. This rejec­tion of vio­lence must be test­ed for a peri­od of time while talks take place to ensure that the TTP knows its place as the weak­er adver­sary, is will­ing to accept the state’s terms and con­di­tions, and only then must be allowed to put forth its requests. But to get to that place, Pak­istan must under­stand TTP as the weak­er adver­sary and the ene­my, not a par­ty it can bar­gain with; it first needs to bring the ter­ror­ists groups respon­si­ble for vio­lence in a place that leaves them with no option but to nego­ti­ate and abide by the options that the state choses to pro­vide them with. Until then, the TTP & co. are like­ly to con­tin­ue their ter­ror tac­tics and con­tin­ue being the absolute ter­ror­ist group that it is, the group that Pak­istan must, in all cir­cum­stances, take out from the root.


Zoha-Waseem
Zoha Waseem is from Karachi and has a post-grad­u­ate from King’s Col­lege Lon­don in Ter­ror­ism, Secu­ri­ty and Soci­ety.


4 Responses

  1. There are always fun­da­men­tal mis­takes in all the writ­ings from pro-war sec­tion of our soci­ety. For instance, war in Pak­istan is part of WOT…and that’s a fact and it is missed by writ­ings from our lib­er­als. This can eas­i­ly be judged by the fact that Pak­istan has wit­nessed more than 200 sui­cide attacks from 2001 to 2013 and there had not been hard­ly 5 attacks from 1947–2001. And more­over, the fact peo­ple that drone attacks and mil­i­tary oper­a­tions did ignite the issue and there were more attacks after 2004. These are the facts which shall be part of debate when­ev­er we dis­cuss Tal­iban dri­ven ter­ror­ism. What has been the most dam­ag­ing impact of this war is sui­cide attacks and to tack­le sui­cide attacks you just need to reverse things and make them look the way they were before 2001. That’s the solu­tion which Pak­istan can achieve as lib­er­als can not defeat the ones with beard in Pak­istan.

  2. Hel­lo, Tahir. Thanks for your response. I agree that the GWOT is very much our war and you raise good points about sui­cide ter­ror­ism in Pak­istan. Per­haps I can tack­le that in anoth­er arti­cle some time, but for now I think revers­ing the effects of Tal­iban-dri­ven ter­ror­ism from Pak­istan and erad­i­cat­ing sui­cide ter­ror­ism essen­tial­ly means chang­ing mind­sets and per­cep­tions. The only way a ter­ror­ist group can suc­cess­ful­ly stop its use of sui­cide attacks is if/when it becomes an unpop­u­lar or unsuc­cess­ful mode of attack. For the moment, such attacks are suc­cess­ful in trig­ger­ing fear (and thus, resent­ment towards the state which looks like its fail­ing to do its job of pro­tect­ing cit­i­zens), in killing peo­ple, in attract­ing media atten­tion, in cre­at­ing dra­ma (which is essen­tial­ly what ter­ror­ism is). It’s dif­fi­cult to say how Pak­istan can make sui­cide ter­ror­ism look like an unpop­u­lar tac­tic for ter­ror­ists, that would require a mul­ti-dimen­sion­al approach. Any­way, I would say it’s impor­tant to look back even before 2001. South Asi­a’s his­to­ry post-British era tells us that essen­tial­ly Pak­istan was meant to have tense rela­tions with Afghanistan (after the draw­ing up of the Durand line and the divi­sions of Pash­tun areas). Unfor­tu­nate­ly, our lead­ers did noth­ing to wors­en these tense rela­tions and in fact made some very bad deci­sions for vest­ed inter­ests. It will take us a long time to find our way back, and out of this mess..

  3. I meant our lead­ers did noth­ing to stop these rela­tions (Afghanistan-Pak­istan) from wors­en­ing.

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4 Responses

  1. There are always fun­da­men­tal mis­takes in all the writ­ings from pro-war sec­tion of our soci­ety. For instance, war in Pak­istan is part of WOT…and that’s a fact and it is missed by writ­ings from our lib­er­als. This can eas­i­ly be judged by the fact that Pak­istan has wit­nessed more than 200 sui­cide attacks from 2001 to 2013 and there had not been hard­ly 5 attacks from 1947–2001. And more­over, the fact peo­ple that drone attacks and mil­i­tary oper­a­tions did ignite the issue and there were more attacks after 2004. These are the facts which shall be part of debate when­ev­er we dis­cuss Tal­iban dri­ven ter­ror­ism. What has been the most dam­ag­ing impact of this war is sui­cide attacks and to tack­le sui­cide attacks you just need to reverse things and make them look the way they were before 2001. That’s the solu­tion which Pak­istan can achieve as lib­er­als can not defeat the ones with beard in Pak­istan.

  2. Hel­lo, Tahir. Thanks for your response. I agree that the GWOT is very much our war and you raise good points about sui­cide ter­ror­ism in Pak­istan. Per­haps I can tack­le that in anoth­er arti­cle some time, but for now I think revers­ing the effects of Tal­iban-dri­ven ter­ror­ism from Pak­istan and erad­i­cat­ing sui­cide ter­ror­ism essen­tial­ly means chang­ing mind­sets and per­cep­tions. The only way a ter­ror­ist group can suc­cess­ful­ly stop its use of sui­cide attacks is if/when it becomes an unpop­u­lar or unsuc­cess­ful mode of attack. For the moment, such attacks are suc­cess­ful in trig­ger­ing fear (and thus, resent­ment towards the state which looks like its fail­ing to do its job of pro­tect­ing cit­i­zens), in killing peo­ple, in attract­ing media atten­tion, in cre­at­ing dra­ma (which is essen­tial­ly what ter­ror­ism is). It’s dif­fi­cult to say how Pak­istan can make sui­cide ter­ror­ism look like an unpop­u­lar tac­tic for ter­ror­ists, that would require a mul­ti-dimen­sion­al approach. Any­way, I would say it’s impor­tant to look back even before 2001. South Asi­a’s his­to­ry post-British era tells us that essen­tial­ly Pak­istan was meant to have tense rela­tions with Afghanistan (after the draw­ing up of the Durand line and the divi­sions of Pash­tun areas). Unfor­tu­nate­ly, our lead­ers did noth­ing to wors­en these tense rela­tions and in fact made some very bad deci­sions for vest­ed inter­ests. It will take us a long time to find our way back, and out of this mess..

  3. I meant our lead­ers did noth­ing to stop these rela­tions (Afghanistan-Pak­istan) from wors­en­ing.

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Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *