Laaltain

Pakistan: A Society in Perpetual Turmoil

18 اکتوبر، 2013

Zubair Tor­wali

Pakistan-A-Society-in-Perpetual-Turmoil

Today Pakistan’s image on the inter­na­tion­al scene is every­thing but pos­i­tive. The coun­try is known for Tal­iban, ter­ror­ists relat­ed to al-Qae­da, sec­tar­i­an vio­lence, an unsta­ble democ­ra­cy, cor­rupt and fail­ing state insti­tu­tions and an unse­cure nuclear capability—feared to be fall­en in the ter­ror­ists’ hands. Even despite the suc­ces­sive nat­ur­al dis­as­ters in the form of floods, Pak­istan could not move the heart of the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty to extend a sup­port­ing hand.
Lurched in a per­pet­u­al tur­bu­lence since its birth in August 1947, the ordi­nary Pak­ista­nis gained less and paid more. In terms of human devel­op­ment Pak­istan has recent­ly been placed at 141 out of 189 coun­tries in the world. Pover­ty is on con­stant rise with the only vari­able in its inten­si­ty. Lit­er­a­cy rate, accord­ing to offi­cial sources is at 58%. Almost half of the pop­u­la­tion is illiterate—ones who even can­not read the Quran, the holy book of Mus­lims. Dur­ing its short his­to­ry of six­ty five years Pak­istan has direct­ly been ruled by the mil­i­tary for thir­ty years and indi­rect­ly for the remain­ing years.
Cri­sis gripped the coun­try soon after its incep­tion when the found­ing leader—Muhammad Ali Jinnah—died in Sep­tem­ber 1948. Since its very incep­tion Pak­istan has been fac­ing a ter­ri­ble cri­sis of iden­ti­ty and of rea­son of its exis­tence. This con­fu­sion soon led to ‘painful para­dox­es’ as one of Pakistan’s renowned physi­cists and one of Pakistan’s pub­lic intel­lec­tu­als Per­vez Hoodb­hoy asserts. The press­ing ques­tion which haunts Pak­istan even today was whether it be a state based on sec­u­lar­ism for the Mus­lims as major­i­ty cit­i­zens of the Sub­con­ti­nent or an Islam­ic theoc­ra­cy with the fruits of the still much cher­ished Islam­ic law sys­tem called Shari’a. The ques­tion divi­sive as it is in its nature, polar­ized the polit­i­cal lead­ers of Pak­istan in the ini­tial stages; and even­tu­al­ly obvert­ed the coun­try to dic­ta­tor­ship delay­ing the con­sti­tu­tion mak­ing for the new­born coun­try.

The press­ing ques­tion which haunts Pak­istan even today was whether it be a state based on sec­u­lar­ism for the Mus­lims as major­i­ty cit­i­zens of the Sub­con­ti­nent or an Islam­ic theoc­ra­cy with the fruits of the still much cher­ished Islam­ic law sys­tem called Shari’a.

The uphold­ers of the dis­course that Pak­istan was meant to be a sec­u­lar Mus­lim state relied on the famous speech of Mr. Jin­nah to the first Con­stituent Assem­bly of Pak­istan four days before the for­mal par­ti­tion of the Unit­ed India. In that speech he expound­ed that Pak­istan would be a free state where­in its inhab­i­tants would be equal cit­i­zens first and then Mus­lims, Chris­tians or Hin­dus; and reli­gion would have no role in pol­i­tics as it is an indi­vid­ual mat­ter of the cit­i­zens. Where­as the oppo­nents held a dif­fer­ent view that stat­ed: Pak­istan would be an Islam­ic state where the main inspi­ra­tion in all spheres of human life would be Islam. They would also find scores of speech­es and poems by Mr. Jin­nah and the poet-philoso­pher, Muham­mad Iqbal respec­tive­ly. The lat­ter had always longed for a Mus­lim renais­sance or Gold­en Peri­od. The two groups were thus at log­ger­heads at the expense of craft­ing an ear­ly con­sti­tu­tion and democ­ra­cy.
As the unfor­tu­nate his­to­ry of Mus­lims shows Islam has always been used for polit­i­cal pow­er. Inter­est­ing­ly, the cler­ics whose par­ties opposed the mak­ing of Pak­istan before 1947 grad­u­al­ly came to the stage and orga­nized street pow­er. Con­se­quent­ly, they suc­ceed­ed to pass the Objec­tives Res­o­lu­tion in 1949, which resolved that Islam would be the objec­tive of the future con­sti­tu­tion, thus mak­ing ground for the adven­tures and exper­i­ments done in Pak­istan in the name of Islam.
The delay in con­sti­tu­tion mak­ing and the ambi­tion of gain­ing pow­er by the civ­il and mil­i­tary bureau­crats paved way to the mil­i­tary dic­ta­tor­ship of Gen­er­al Ayub Khan in 1958.
In search of a ratio­nale and ide­ol­o­gy the Two Nation The­o­ry i.e. Mus­lims and Hin­dus of unit­ed India are two dis­tinct nations, being attrib­uted to two dif­fer­ent religions—advocated before the par­ti­tion by men like Muham­mad Iqbal and Jin­nah himself—was rein­vent­ed. The Mul­lahs brought the pre-par­ti­tion sec­tar­i­an strife to Pak­istan. Riots against Ahmadiya sect which was con­sid­ered infi­dels by many Mus­lims for their alleged nega­tion of the end of prophet­hood in Islam after Muham­mad (PBUP) broke out in all major cities of Pak­istan with Lahore as the heart­land.
In order to cohere a diverse new­born coun­try Mr. Jin­nah and com­pan­ions fault­i­ly applied the exclu­sive pol­i­cy of one-reli­gion-one-lan­guage the­o­ry to the whole coun­try. Urdu, being a major bone of con­tention before par­ti­tion, was made the only Nation­al Lan­guage irre­spec­tive of the fact that only a fringe of pop­u­la­tion in Pak­istan spoke it and con­se­quent­ly denied the due rights to the major­i­ty lan­guage, Ben­gali, spo­ken in for­mer East Pakistan—today’s Bangladesh. This along with oth­er fac­tors aggriev­ed the Ben­galis who used to be in the fore­front of the move­ment for Pak­istan. Eth­nic riots were start­ed in Ben­gal in the ear­ly fifties and these cul­mi­nat­ed in ces­sa­tion of East Pak­istan into a sov­er­eign coun­try in 1971 after a fierce civ­il war in East Pak­istan which only end­ed with a direct involve­ment of India and a dis­grace­ful defeat for Pak­istan.

In order to cohere a diverse new­born coun­try Mr. Jin­nah and com­pan­ions fault­i­ly applied the exclu­sive pol­i­cy of one-reli­gion-one-lan­guage the­o­ry to the whole coun­try.

The deba­cle of East Pak­istan in 1971 was a turn­ing point in Pak­istan which shaped the future events and the cat­a­stroph­ic con­se­quences of which Pak­ista­nis are still vic­tims. A more intense India cen­tric secu­ri­ty pol­i­cy took ground with­in the Pak­istani secu­ri­ty appa­ra­tus. The dis­par­i­ty between the civ­il and mil­i­tary pow­er play­ers deep­ened fur­ther and con­spir­a­cy the­o­ries became com­mon among ordi­nary Pak­ista­nis. Hatred against India reached new heights and the minori­ties with­in Pak­istani soci­ety were con­sid­ered in com­plic­i­ty with India. Once again riots against the Ahmadiya sect became coun­try­wide and at last forced the oth­er­wise lib­er­al posed pop­ulist leader Zul­fiqar Ali Bhut­to to declare the Ahmadiya sect non-Mus­lim through a con­sti­tu­tion­al amend­ment in 1974. Three years lat­er Pak­istan saw anoth­er mar­tial law imposed by the fun­da­men­tal­ist Gen­er­al Zia Ul Haq. Though long before that indoc­tri­na­tion of the nation was start­ed through course books in schools and state owned media, Gen­er­al Zia and cronies gave it a new dimen­sion. To his res­cue the Cold War was brought to South Asia by the Unit­ed States which covert­ly armed Pak­istan to fight the for­mer Sovi­et Union in Afghanistan. The Afghan war was sold as jihad—holy war—in Pak­istan and rad­i­cal Islam­ic par­ties and jiha­di out­fits like the Jama’at-e-Islami and Jami­at-e-Ule­ma-e-Islam were hired to fight the war in Afghanistan along with the Pak­istan spy agency Inter Ser­vices Agency or ISI.
With this back­ground we can under­stand the malaise Pak­istani soci­ety is fac­ing now; and unfor­tu­nate­ly there is no bright side to it in the near future.
Pak­istan is a diverse soci­ety with six­ty small eth­no-lin­guis­tic com­mu­ni­ties apart from the known major four name­ly Pun­jabis, Push­tuns, Sind­his and Balochs; and all of them have been denied their eth­nic iden­ti­ty by forc­ing them into a sin­gle enti­ty based on reli­gion only. The social iden­ti­ty in Pak­istan is main­ly based on three enti­ties: reli­gion, eth­nic­i­ty and tribe or caste. As with every form of iden­ti­ty reli­gious iden­ti­ty has fur­ther divid­ed into innu­mer­able sects. How­ev­er, the divi­sion based on reli­gious iden­ti­ty in Pak­istan is much more wide­spread and deep­ened. This divi­sion has giv­en birth to the men­ace of sec­tar­i­an vio­lence and inces­sant per­se­cu­tion of reli­gious minori­ties in Pak­istan. As Mr. Irfan Hus­sain, the author of ‘Fatal Fault­lines’ right­ly writes, ‘’faith is prob­a­bly the most impor­tant in a Muslim’s identity—an idea quite alien to most West­ern­ers, who usu­al­ly define them­selves in terms oth­er than pure­ly reli­gious ideas. If asked who they are, most Mus­lim believ­ers would reply ‘Mus­lim’ before nam­ing their nation­al­i­ty or eth­nic group’’.
Eco­nom­i­cal­ly the Pak­istani soci­ety presents a dis­mal sce­nario. The mid­dle class is shrink­ing while the bour­geois is expand­ing not in num­ber but in wealth. Feu­dal­ism could not be curbed here and the pol­i­tics is still feu­dal­is­tic and trib­al. Since its incep­tion feu­dal­ism in Pak­istan could not be root­ed out because of a num­ber of fac­tors includ­ing the reli­gious sanc­ti­ty to save it. Every time any move for reforms in feu­dal­ism was resist­ed by the reli­gious lead­ers who thought land reform un-Islam­ic. The nexus between feu­dal­ism and reli­gion is one of the hard­est obsta­cles in the way of social devel­op­ment in Pak­istan. Feu­dal lords backed by reli­gion are still hav­ing a greater say in the coun­try affairs. Kin­ship goes after men and the soci­ety is over­whelm­ing­ly men dom­i­nat­ed. Most of the women lead their life in dis­tress, mis­ery and despon­dence. Reli­gious minori­ties and poor are the least secure.
The woman in gen­er­al is not regard­ed as an inde­pen­dent enti­ty in her own right. She is con­trolled by the man—father, hus­band, broth­er and even son. Women are deemed the most sig­nif­i­cant part of fam­i­ly hon­our and any vio­la­tion by woman can cause her mur­der. She is not allowed to work freely; and men usu­al­ly con­sid­er any job by women against the hon­our of the fam­i­ly and clan. Recent­ly a local jirga—assembly of the local men—in Indus Kohis­tan, one of the least devel­oped dis­tricts in Pak­istan ordered the death of five women for danc­ing and clap­ping in a wed­ding cer­e­mo­ny. Hard­ly any week pass­es with­out the news of women killed for hon­our in Pak­istan.
Many Pak­istani Mus­lims believe that edu­cat­ing girls might lead them to an un-Islam­ic and immoral lifestyle. This is very com­mon in parts of rur­al Pak­istan where the influ­ence of the tri­bo-reli­gious nexus is strong. Most par­ents usu­al­ly do not per­mit their daugh­ters to get edu­ca­tion and those who let them push them out of school after the age of puber­ty when the child hard­ly attains the 8th grade edu­ca­tion.
It is also very com­mon in many parts of Pak­istan to bar women from cast­ing votes. This is often done well orga­nized. In Shangla, Indus Kohis­tan and in some dis­tricts in south­ern belt of Khy­ber Pakhtunkhwa, the north­west fron­tier province, women were barred by the local trib­al jir­gas from cast­ing votes.
When a state owes its mak­ing to reli­gion; and suc­ces­sive carv­ing of that ide­ol­o­gy, one should hard­ly be sur­prised when that reli­gion comes to dom­i­nate the pub­lic dis­course and influ­ence indi­vid­ual think­ing and social behav­ior. Reli­gion is among the most fun­da­men­tal char­ac­ter­is­tics of Pak­istani soci­ety which influ­ences the soci­ety in its all con­tours from social devel­op­ment to human rights. Pub­lic opin­ion is immense­ly shaped by the mullahs—religious lead­ers who lead the prayers five times dai­ly and deliv­er the Fri­day ser­mons. The mul­lah spread ven­om of hatred in the soci­ety and very often fans fire of sec­tar­i­an strife in the soci­ety.
It is extreme­ly dif­fi­cult for the few peo­ple to pub­licly call them­selves sec­u­lar or lib­er­al; and sec­u­lars also sub­scribe them­selves to reli­gion because of the wrath of the soci­ety in gen­er­al. Sec­u­lar­ism in Pak­istan is equat­ed with infi­deli­ty or God­less­ness.
An aver­age Pak­istani takes reli­gion seri­ous­ly and wish­es to see it in pub­lic mat­ters. How­ev­er, many of them do not sub­scribe to the ver­sion held by Tal­iban yet the Tal­iban are not con­demned in the way India or Unit­ed States of Amer­i­ca is bashed. An aver­age Pak­istani wants progress with­out los­ing his reli­gious con­ser­vatism and owing to that he pos­es a con­fused pos­ture when asked about the Tal­iban. On the one hand, he can­not chal­lenge the mil­i­tant out­fits because of his con­ser­vatism where­as on the oth­er hand he aspires for pro­gres­sive­ness expound­ed by media, gov­ern­ment and intel­li­gentsia.

Pak­istan is a diverse soci­ety with six­ty small eth­no-lin­guis­tic com­mu­ni­ties apart from the known major four name­ly Pun­jabis, Push­tuns, Sind­his and Balochs; and all of them have been denied their eth­nic iden­ti­ty by forc­ing them into a sin­gle enti­ty based on reli­gion only.

Almost all the mosques in Pak­istan are equipped with loud­speak­ers used by the cler­ics for their pub­lic ser­mo­niz­ing. Peo­ple learn reli­gion from the very begin­ning of their lives, in moth­ers’ laps, in schools, in reli­gious sem­i­nar­ies; from reli­gious teach­ers vis­it­ing homes, through tele­vi­sion and print media. In every­day inter­ac­tions indi­vid­u­als are keen to lec­ture oth­ers on mat­ters per­tain­ing to reli­gious rit­u­als such as five times prayers; and how to fol­low the injunc­tions ordained by God in the Koran. The over­whelm­ing major­i­ty in Pak­istan accepts the right­eous­ness of the reli­gious cler­ics, prayers lead­ers and preach­ers. Even a man with beard is usu­al­ly deemed more pious than the one who does not have it.
Major­i­ty of the peo­ple wants their women to wear the Islam­ic pur­d­ha (veil). Many of them attribute Pakistan’s ubiq­ui­tous prob­lems as a result of the devi­a­tion from Islam. The major­i­ty does not think a per­son bet­ter Mus­lim who does not pray five times a day.
A vis­i­ble phe­nom­e­non has recent­ly been noticed. The emerg­ing reli­gious rigid­i­ty is increas­ing day by day. Vio­lent inter­pre­ta­tion of Islam is replac­ing the rel­a­tive­ly peace­ful obser­vance of reli­gion. Reli­gion grows more rigid with each pass­ing day.
The Indi­an Sub­con­ti­nent was home to the rich Sufi tra­di­tion and that was the most impor­tant fac­tor for the con­ver­sion of the indige­nous peo­ple to Islam on the land. Sufis have his­tor­i­cal­ly been sym­bols of love, tol­er­ance and plu­ral­ism, but in today’s Pak­istan a rigid puri­tan­i­cal ver­sion of Islam is rapid­ly spread­ing main­ly due to the state patron­age and mon­ey from Sau­di Ara­bia. The Sufi’s shrines are blown up by the mil­i­tants and ter­ror­ists. Most of the pop­u­lar Sufi shrines in Pak­istan have been tar­get­ed by the extrem­ists. The mau­soleum of Pash­to Sufi poet in Peshawar, the shrines of Bari Imam and Gol­ra Sharif in Islam­abad, the shrine of the Ali Hajev­eri (Data Ganj Baksh) in Lahore and the mau­soleum of Shah Abdul­lah Ghazi in Karachi are among the famous which were tar­get­ed by the ter­ror­ists recent­ly.
The spir­i­tu­al spir­it of Islam is now being replaced by the exhi­bi­tion­ist ver­sion which empha­sizes on cer­tain overt acts such as say­ing of prayers, obser­vance of fast, dress code, grow­ing a beard, absten­tion from drink­ing alco­hol and the annu­al pil­grim­age to Mec­ca in Sau­di Ara­bia. While val­ues such as sanc­ti­ty of human life, respect­ing rights of oth­ers, social hon­esty and truth­ful­ness, and con­tri­bu­tion towards human­i­ty are not con­sid­ered impor­tant by the fol­low­ers of the reli­gion. Sad but true!
Peo­ple are too prone to con­spir­a­cy the­o­ries. Many of the ills in Pak­istan are inter­pret­ed with some spe­cif­ic mind­set and are usu­al­ly regard­ed the ill designs of Unit­ed States, India or Israel. Nat­ur­al calami­ties are described as wrath of God. The 2010 dev­as­tat­ing floods and the 2005 earth­quake are termed as wrath of God upon peo­ple because of their sins.
Like every calami­ty the recent floods in Pak­istan have trig­gered a debate about the cause of the floods. The dis­cus­sion is car­ried out by the cler­gy and the ordi­nary folk under the sway of the for­mer; and by the sci­en­tif­ic and ratio­nal minds of the soci­ety, but the cler­gy seems advan­taged, as always in the case of an over­whelm­ing conservative/primitive soci­ety of Pak­istan where every nat­ur­al phe­nom­e­non is inter­pret­ed on abstract spec­u­la­tion as the peo­ple in the prim­i­tive soci­eties used to do. The major­i­ty of the peo­ple tread the way held by the cler­gy. For exam­ple, in Swat the over­whelm­ing major­i­ty of the peo­ple believe that what they have been expe­ri­enc­ing since 2007, either in the shape of the mil­i­tan­cy or the floods and drought, is the wrath of God. Soon after the floods the loud­speak­ers on the minarets of the mosques were echoed with the exhor­ta­tions by the Mul­lah in charge fright­en­ing the peo­ple of God’s wrath for their ‘sins’.

An aver­age Pak­istani wants progress with­out los­ing his reli­gious con­ser­vatism and owing to that he pos­es a con­fused pos­ture when asked about the Tal­iban.

A sim­i­lar debate is going on in the edi­to­r­i­al pages of the nation­al dailies and mag­a­zines. One such exam­ple is the debate over the remarks of Maulana Tariq Jameel of the Tab­lighi Jamaat. The Maulana declared that the recent floods in Pak­istan are the effect of our ‘sins’.
Our cler­gy has always been giv­en a larg­er share by the state and the mass­es; the lat­ter has out of igno­rance. The state itself is in total agree­ment with what the cler­gy spews. Maulana Tariq belongs to the Tab­lighi Jamaat which has so far ‘purged’ many heretics and sin­ners. Our crick­et team is their worst vic­tim which now believes to win every match with the help of prayers (dua).
Maulana Tariq Jameel rides the same band­wag­on of the pious. They are always there to enjoy great respect of the mass­es. Our mass­es, being une­d­u­cat­ed and cred­u­lous, have always been easy prey to the mis­use of reli­gion for world­ly gains in pol­i­tics or soci­ety. They are some­times led (mis­led) by slo­gans like Niza­mi Mustafa or Islam­ic Shari’a. The worst crimes in Pak­istan have been com­mit­ted by using such abstract slo­gans.
It is not only the calami­ties our cler­gy even attribute the acute pover­ty as God’s will, some­times a bless­ing.
With such stark polar­iza­tion the soci­ety in Pak­istan can be cat­e­go­rized into a num­ber of stra­ta in terms of how they see polit­i­cal pow­ers and how they indulge in it.
First, those who are entan­gled in the pow­er game with­in the state. They are both civil­ian and mil­i­tary. The polit­i­cal pow­er main­ly seems a tug of war between the elites—feudal lords, reli­gio-politi­co lead­ers, and the mil­i­tary gen­er­als. And now to this band­wag­on the judges and lawyers have also stepped in. Amidst this sit­u­a­tion the major­i­ty of ordi­nary Pak­ista­nis are des­per­ate­ly wait­ing for a mes­si­ah. They are the largest in pop­u­la­tion whose only con­cern in life is now left the dai­ly bread and the obser­vance of dai­ly reli­gious rit­u­als. They usu­al­ly do not have any inter­est in what hap­pens in Islam­abad, the cap­i­tal of Pak­istan. Pol­i­tics is com­pe­ti­tion and the ordi­nary peo­ple just strug­gle to sur­vive. This major­i­ty is con­ser­v­a­tive in their out­look but abstains from going with the Islamists. They are dis­in­ter­est­ed in pol­i­tics and pub­lic dis­course. Most of them lack access to either the sources of infor­ma­tion and edu­ca­tion. Mul­lah reigns here but social­ly only as these peo­ple are too entan­gled with their woes afflict­ed by pover­ty and a dys­func­tion­al state. These peo­ple most­ly live in rur­al Pak­istan; and are most­ly loy­al to the land­lords in their respec­tive vil­lages. They are less inter­est­ed in vote cast­ing and are most­ly moti­vat­ed by the vil­lage feu­dal lords to cast votes in the time of elec­tion because the com­pet­ing lords con­test elec­tions from the plat­form of the var­i­ous polit­i­cal par­ties.

The polit­i­cal pow­er main­ly seems a tug of war between the elites—feudal lords, reli­gio-politi­co lead­ers, and the mil­i­tary gen­er­als. And now to this band­wag­on the judges and lawyers have also stepped in.

The sec­ond largest class is the Pak­istani state spon­sored edu­cat­ed ones. They are usu­al­ly more active in pub­lic life and polit­i­cal dis­course. Main­ly dri­ven by the biased edu­ca­tion and a robust but uncon­trolled mass media they usu­al­ly do not deem the demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­ern­ments effi­cient. They are too prone to the Pakistan’s Urdu elec­tron­ic media. A con­sid­er­able num­ber of them also use social media, espe­cial­ly the face­book. Mul­lah reigns here, too, and per­haps more effec­tive­ly. These peo­ple are usu­al­ly made the key dri­vers for polit­i­cal Islam and pan Islamism. They are divid­ed on line of ide­ol­o­gy with an over­whelm­ing major­i­ty with reli­gious ortho­doxy.
Third, the urban­ite civ­il soci­ety and busi­ness class is West­ern­ized in lifestyle. Most of them have their edu­ca­tion from insti­tu­tions abroad. The busi­ness class has noth­ing to do with the pow­ers in Islam­abad. How­ev­er, they exer­cise con­sid­er­able influ­ence in the pow­er game in the cen­ter. They fund the elec­tion of cer­tain polit­i­cal forces for their vest­ed inter­est and have inroads in the country’s pow­er­ful mil­i­tary and oth­er insti­tu­tions as well. The real estate tycoon, Malik Riaz is just an exam­ple who recent­ly sur­faced in a scan­dal involv­ing the son of the most pow­er­ful chief jus­tice of Pak­istan, Jus­tice Ifikhar Muham­mad Chod­hary, in Pakistan’s 65 years che­quered his­to­ry.
The West­ern­ized civ­il soci­ety most­ly based in the country’s urban cen­ters, Islam­abad, Lahore and Karachi has too lim­it­ed a direct con­tact with the ordi­nary peo­ple main­ly owing to their look­ing alien to the peo­ple and speak­ing Eng­lish or a mix of it which the ordi­nary peo­ple do not under­stand. Of course, many of them do have good inten­tions and con­cerns of human rights; and have remark­ably con­tributed to the soci­ety in large, yet in Pak­istan they still have to go miles to get a firm ground among the gen­er­al mass­es. Most of them do not exer­cise their right to vote because of their dis­may with the exist­ing polit­i­cal par­ties in Pak­istan. Nonethe­less, they do have gen­uine peo­ple among them who have been fight­ing for the rights of the peo­ple con­stant­ly sab­o­taged by the country’s var­i­ous insti­tu­tions.
In these cir­cum­stances there is left less room for hope. One gets fright­ened and meets bit­ter chal­lenges work­ing along­side the peo­ple for their well­be­ing and social uplift. Per­haps an ascent from these tumul­tuous times lies only in the con­sis­ten­cy of democ­ra­cy with a strong sup­port from the civ­il soci­ety and media.


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Zubair Tor­wali, a rights activist, researcher based in Bahrain, Swat where he also leads IBT an inde­pen­dent orga­ni­za­tion for the rights, edu­ca­tion and envi­ron­ment for the mar­gin­al­ized com­mu­ni­ties. Email: ztorwali@gmail.com


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