The Non-Negotiable Deal

His­tor­i­cal­ly, reli­gious indoc­tri­na­tion has been used as a com­mon prac­tice in Pak­istan to pro­duce the ele­ment of nation­al­ism and patri­o­tism to deter the ene­mies of Islam and Pak­istan. As a result the notion of patri­o­tism and nation­al­ism is rad­i­cal­ly dis­si­pat­ed. An entire school of thought in the shape of polit­i­cal and reli­gious par­ties have emerged prac­tic­ing vio­lent behav­iors in the name of reli­gion and patri­o­tism. That is one of the rea­sons that Pak­istan has long been called a bas­tion of extrem­ism and right­ly so.

Pak­istan has remained trapped in per­sis­tent intra state con­flicts great­ly under­min­ing the inter­nal sov­er­eign­ty and rule of law. The opti­mism, expec­ta­tions and media hype that we are wit­ness­ing today was the same at a time when gov­ern­ment resort­ed to hold peace talks with Tal­iban in the past. But the result was nev­er some­thing sub­stan­tial and nev­er did the TTP dis­arm itself and attempt­ed to rein­te­grate in the main­stream civ­il soci­ety of Pak­istan.

Gov­ern­ment needs to under­stand that talks once again at this stage are any­thing but a mere exer­cise of futil­i­ty. There are num­ber of fac­tions among the TTP based in FATA and Pun­jab like Feday­een al-Islam, Haqqani Net­work, Ansar Al-Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Sipah-e-Saha­ba Pak­istan (SSP), Jaish-e-Muham­mad (JeM), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), and Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Isla­mi (HuJI) and that with­out any clear hier­ar­chy. TTP is com­posed of cer­tain groups who pur­sue inter­ests with dis­tinct inter­nal and exter­nal agen­das. Some fac­tions tar­get secu­ri­ty instal­la­tions while oth­ers are involved in tar­get­ing minori­ties and Shia Mus­lims across Pak­istan.

TTP has been unwa­ver­ing in its spread of vio­lence while inter­me­di­aries were busy in craft­ing an out­line for the talks to move on. The lat­est attack in F‑8 sec­tor Islam­abad and the pre­vi­ous rounds of sui­cide attacks which were owned by Ahrarul Hind and by TTP Peshawar region respec­tive­ly speaks lengths about the lack of con­sen­sus in hold­ing pro­duc­tive talks with the gov­ern­ment. There have been as many as 48 report­ed inci­dents since gov­ern­ment announced to hold dia­logue with the TTP. The attack on the bus car­ry­ing police forces in Karachi which killed 13 police men and the ruth­less behead­ing of 30 para­mil­i­tary forces hap­pened at a time when the peace com­mit­tees were mak­ing an effort to arrange a cease­fire.

The his­to­ry of peace talks is not some­thing to cher­ish about. The major fail­ures are still afresh in the minds of peo­ple of Pak­istan. The Shakai peace agree­ment in April 2004 with the nefar­i­ous Nek Moham­mad was the first accord of its kind. It lat­er end­ed after Nek Moham­mad refused to dis­lodge the for­eign fight­ers resid­ing in FATA which he had promised. He was lat­er killed in drone strike fol­lowed by a mil­i­tary oper­a­tion by Pak­istan army. Anoth­er peace agree­ment was signed known as Sararogha agree­ment in Feb­ru­ary 2005 with Bait­ul­lah Mehsud. He was respon­si­ble for the killings of thou­sands of Pak­ista­nis. The deal end­ed after accu­sa­tions and counter accu­sa­tions of vio­lat­ing the agree­ment. The peace agree­ment offered Bait­ul­lah Mehsud to recruit new fight­ers and expand his area of con­trol.

The ruth­less Bait­ul­lah Mehsud claimed respon­si­bil­i­ty for sev­er­al dead­ly attacks inside Pak­istan. He was also declared as one of the main archi­tects behind the killing of PPP leader and for­mer Prime Min­is­ter Benazir Bhut­to. The Swat peace agree­ment of May 2008 is a silent reminder of total fail­ure of rec­on­cil­i­a­tion, rein­te­gra­tion and nego­ti­a­tion attempts. This agree­ment allowed Tal­iban to take the admin­is­tra­tive con­trol of the area and impose laws as per the TTP’s ver­sion of Sharia. It col­lapsed after Tal­iban resort­ed to expand their sphere of influ­ence.
TTP has now mas­tered the art of buy­ing time. They have been using the mantra of peace talks for strength­en­ing rein­force­ments, prisoner’s releas­es, mon­e­tary com­pen­sa­tion and pow­er con­sol­i­da­tion.

The nar­ra­tive float­ing in the minds of advo­cates of nego­ti­a­tions that Amer­i­ca is hold­ing talks with the Tal­iban so shall we is very naive thought. Let’s be mind­ful of the fact that Amer­i­ca has killed Osama Bin Ladin, a nefar­i­ous Al-Qaee­da leader who is equal­ly adored by the Afghan and Pak­istani Tal­iban. The objec­tive of emas­cu­lat­ing Tal­iban has been great­ly achieved and they have installed a polit­i­cal set­up which is ready for the first suc­cess­ful his­toric polit­i­cal tran­si­tion. Attempts to bring the Tal­iban fight­ers in the main­stream pol­i­tics are only to ensure a smooth with­draw­al from Afghanistan.

We are cer­tain­ly not craft­ing an exit strat­e­gy from the trib­al areas of Pak­istan. Our case is fun­da­men­tal­ly and prin­ci­pal­ly dif­fer­ent from that of US in Afghanistan. The trib­al belt of Pak­istan is a legit­i­mate ter­ri­to­ry of Pak­istan. Pak­istan is deal­ing with a law­less region which is of immense strate­gic impor­tance. Decades old law­less­ness has made the region an Achilles’ heel while deal­ing with ter­ror­ism. Absence of rule of law in FATA makes it a very fer­tile ground for inter­na­tion­al ter­ror­ism. Its prox­im­i­ty with the Afghanistan makes it a per­fect launch­ing pad for attacks inside Afghanistan and Pak­istan with impuni­ty which will fur­ther under­mine the already in tat­ters Af-Pak rela­tions.

Dia­logue could be pos­si­ble only when the objec­tives of nego­ti­a­tions are attain­able and goals are clear. The prospects of dia­logue through pow­er­less inter­me­di­aries are a fail­ure already.

An appro­pri­ate use of force cou­pled with sus­tain­able socio-eco­nom­ic reforms will sure­ly pave the way for peace in the area. A well coor­di­nat­ed oper­a­tion involv­ing Pak­istan army, police and oth­er para­mil­i­tary forces in the urban cen­ters will effec­tive­ly reduce the strength of TTP. One has to be mind­ful of the fact that trib­al areas have a unique cul­ture where adher­ence to the notions and deci­sions of trib­al elders and chief­tains is a tra­di­tion. Along with a well coor­di­nat­ed oper­a­tion gov­ern­ment should take the long side­lined Trib­al elders of the FATA region on board and deal with them while con­sid­er­ing them as stake hold­ers. More­over if the gov­ern­ment is sin­cere to stop fur­ther blood­shed it needs to start inte­grat­ing the law­less region into the main­stream Pak­istan.