Laaltain

Beyond Talks or Operations

18 نومبر، 2013

Saif Ullah Nasar

beyond talks or operations

With the recent rise in tide of ter­ror­ism, we are again in the maze of whether to fight the mil­i­tants or to get into talks with them. The way both ‘talk or oper­a­tion’ posi­tions are framed, a stark­er real­i­ty is ignored: unless the role of our army and intel­li­gence agen­cies is prop­er­ly har­nessed, ter­ror­ism would con­tin­ue to sprout and export from this coun­try under one pre­text or anoth­er.

Until now we have only thought with­in the ‘fight-flight’ par­a­digm jus­ti­fy­ing one or the oth­er stance mere­ly on nor­ma­tive grounds: either to com­bat the mil­i­tants or to get our­selves screwed (leav­ing behind the talk option with­out due con­sid­er­a­tion). Let’s have an auda­cious atti­tude to con­front a prac­ti­cal judge­ment over the issue at hand: In case we dis­miss the talk option before opt­ing for it or we come up with dis­mal results out of the talk process, what would be the next step? Of course, as major­i­ty will posit, to do away with the mil­i­tants by iron hand.

Well, let’s delay the judge­ment for a while and be not so apt in tak­ing the deci­sion. Let’s ask our­selves sim­ply, is our army capa­ble of wip­ing out the mil­i­tants? And whether the mil­i­tary can be trust­ed suf­fi­cient­ly to con­duct oper­a­tion sin­cere­ly against its sup­pos­ed­ly ‘strate­gic assets’?

With­in few years after the so called ‘suc­cess­ful’ oper­a­tion in Swat, we could not suc­ceed in keep­ing mil­i­tants away from it. Appar­ent­ly our civ­il admin­is­tra­tion could not keep them aloof from the area after the mil­i­tary had left. Obvi­ous­ly, we can­not afford sta­tion­ing our army for a long time in one area; at some­time we have to han­dover it to the civil­ian author­i­ties. This proves, how­ev­er, any­thing but fail­ure of a state.

Let’s ask our­selves sim­ply, is our army capa­ble of wip­ing out the mil­i­tants? And whether the mil­i­tary can be trust­ed suf­fi­cient­ly to con­duct oper­a­tion sin­cere­ly against its sup­pos­ed­ly ‘strate­gic assets’?

More­over, arguably it was not the army that brushed aside the mil­i­tants in Swat. Rather it could be attrib­uted more to an estab­lished tac­tic of gueril­la fight­ers, as no doubt the Tal­iban are, i.e. to with­draw, adding into their elu­sive­ness, and then recoil back with new strate­gies adopt­ed, ren­der­ing the army more vul­ner­a­ble. But it does not nec­es­sar­i­ly mean that gueril­las can­not be defeat­ed. Of course, they could be but it will also mean, besides many oth­er fac­tors, need­ing more mon­ey and resources which, unfor­tu­nate­ly, would be a greater stress for already crip­pling state of econ­o­my.

Also crack­ing militant’s ide­o­log­i­cal sup­port in the region – of which main­ly our estab­lish­ment is respon­si­ble for – with dis­parate thought on reli­gious issues, is such a task that seem to make it an unend­ing war to be won. Unless we active­ly counter the ide­o­log­i­cal sup­port of the mil­i­tants in the region, we can­not elim­i­nate the pos­si­bil­i­ty of a steep rise in the mil­i­tan­cy.

Fur­ther­more, anoth­er impor­tant fact that should be high­light­ed is that our armed forces are at log­ger­head against Baloch sep­a­ratists for more than a decade but could not claim a deci­sive vic­to­ry against them. Over years, with no effec­tive fil­i­buster from media, politi­cians and civ­il soci­ety, Fron­tier Crops, occa­sion­al­ly aug­ment­ed by the Army, has not come up with a great suc­cess against the move­ment. Instead provo­ca­tion is much on soar than ever before.

In com­par­i­son Baloch sep­a­ratist orga­ni­za­tions are less dread­ful, small, poor­ly orga­nized and have no bet­ter resorts as Tal­iban usu­al­ly have, by and large. These fac­tors fur­ther add to the skep­ti­cism about our armed forces’ capac­i­ty to erad­i­cate or at least con­tain ter­ror­ism in the coun­try. Gen. Kiyani has prob­a­bly sensed this pow­er­less­ness, thus had to defend the army’s morale while address­ing recent pass­ing out can­di­dates in Kakul.

Also, those who con­tin­ue to cel­e­brate the armed forces’ entry into Waziris­tan should keep in mind that the armed forces won this right to entry with per­mis­sion of the ‘good’ Tal­iban. This fact impli­cates a seri­ous doubt on prowess of the mil­i­tary in the region.
Apart from the issue of capa­bil­i­ty, the sin­cer­i­ty fac­tor in our army rais­es more con­cern. The ques­tion remains, what is after all the use of mil­i­tants?

It is has been report­ed by var­i­ous sources that Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Saha­ba or Ahle Sun­nat wa Al Jam­mat along with the Jamat ul Dawa are recruit­ing many Baloch youth to keep them away from join­ing sep­a­ratists’ ranks, under the alleged tac­it patron­age of the Army.
Besides this, with the Tal­iban Shu­ra shift­ed from FATA to Balochis­tan – lat­er named Quet­ta Shu­ra – accom­pa­nied with trans­fer of Taliban’s train­ing camps is a sig­nif­i­cant devel­op­ment with regard to the rapid recruit­ment of Baloch youth by var­i­ous mil­i­tant orga­ni­za­tions. It seems as if Army is in haste shift­ing its ‘strate­gic assets’ from FATA to Balochis­tan for two rea­sons: first­ly, the Army wants fresh and loy­al breed of mil­i­tants raised and trained under and through reli­able mil­i­tant orga­ni­za­tions aka the ‘good Tal­iban’ (and mean­while to get rid of the bad ones). Sec­ond­ly, this would also help abate the sep­a­ratists’ move­ment in the region by redi­rect­ing the Baloch youth.

In fact, for the time being, our pol­i­cy mak­ers along with the army seem con­sumed only with the TTP or the ‘bad Tal­iban’ but not with the mil­i­tan­cy on a broad­er lev­el.

With these devel­op­ments tak­ing place, those who advo­cate mil­i­tary oper­a­tion against the talks might get dis­heart­en to real­ize that the army does not appear to have clear inten­tions to com­plete­ly erad­i­cate ter­ror­ists from this coun­try. In fact, for the time being, our pol­i­cy mak­ers along with the army seem con­sumed only with the TTP or the ‘bad Tal­iban’ but not with the mil­i­tan­cy on a broad­er lev­el. There are few sane voic­es that take on the estab­lish­ment for play­ing its old game, i.e. to pat the ‘good’ mil­i­tants and intim­i­date the ‘bad’ ones. On the con­trary, those who are voic­ing for peace talks must bear in mind that since the mil­i­tary lacks will to erad­i­cate mil­i­tan­cy, hence the inter­reg­num would help mil­i­tants expand their net­work in the coun­try.

The army, this time, is relo­cat­ing and plant­i­ng the good Tal­iban on new ground, i.e. Balochis­tan. With this bru­tal fact in mind, one must have seri­ous appre­hen­sions about the ‘oper­a­tion’ option. At the end of the day no one would want more IDPs, orphan chil­dren, and des­ti­tute fam­i­lies with­out any future bet­ter­ment regard­ing mil­i­tan­cy. More­over, the mis­di­rect­ed attempts that mak­ing Baloch youth more patri­ot­ic and Islam­ic by relo­cat­ing the good Tal­iban in Balochis­tan would bring us noth­ing but an increase in ter­ror­ism and rival­ry with neigh­bour­ing Iran. And our Shia brethren in the province and else­where in the coun­try who are most vul­ner­a­ble along with oth­er minori­ties are expect­ed to suf­fer immense­ly from such devel­op­ments.

Whether the talks or the mil­i­tary oper­a­tions, both options have to take place under nose of the army and relat­ed intel­li­gence appa­ra­tus which are so far elu­sive to con­sti­tu­tion­al reg­u­la­tions and par­lia­men­tary over­sight. Unless the army and intel­li­gence appa­ra­tus are har­nessed by the Par­lia­ment and can be trust­ed enough, the oper­a­tion option would come up with dis­mal results.


The writer hails from Balochis­tan and has attend­ed For­man Chris­t­ian Col­lege.


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