Why Balochistan is Burning

Rafi­ul­lah Kakar

Locat­ed at the heart of the world’s oil route and with 750 km of high­ly strate­gic Ara­bi­an Sea coast­line, Balochis­tan is the largest province of Pak­istan, with the small­est num­ber of peo­ple. Account­ing for 44% of Pakistan’s land­mass, this Texas-sized province con­sti­tutes mere­ly 5% of the country’s total pop­u­la­tion. It is the least devel­oped and the most impov­er­ished province, where socio-eco­nom­ic real­i­ties paint a somber pic­ture.

The province has been a hotbed of insur­gency since the cre­ation of Pak­istan. The Baloch eth­no-nation­al­ist move­ment, which start­ed in response to colo­nial encroach­ments and grad­u­al­ly thrived in post-colo­nial Pak­istan in response to the high­ly cen­tral­ized pow­er struc­ture of the coun­try, pos­es a seri­ous chal­lenge to the integri­ty of Pak­istan. Cur­rent­ly, an insur­gency is under­way that may have vast and diverse impli­ca­tions not only for Pak­istan and oth­er region­al play­ers but also for the glob­al ‘war on ter­ror’.

Though the move­ment has been striv­ing for secur­ing equal rights and achiev­ing region­al auton­o­my with­in a restruc­tured fed­er­al frame­work, over the years sep­a­ratist feel­ings have inten­si­fied, lead­ing some ele­ments to seek com­plete inde­pen­dence from Pak­istan. Pakistan’s over-cen­tral­ized state sys­tem, weak fed­er­al struc­ture, unre­spon­sive polit­i­cal insti­tu­tions and lengthy dic­ta­to­r­i­al rule, all have giv­en birth to feel­ings of alien­ation and mar­gin­al­iza­tion among the Baloch. Pro­tract­ed mil­i­tary rulers not only kept the Baloch at bay from par­tic­i­pa­tion in the polit­i­cal sys­tem but also fre­quent­ly used force against them to curb their sep­a­ratist ten­den­cies. Suc­ces­sive mil­i­tary oper­a­tions against the Baloch in 1948, 1958, 1974, and 2004 cre­at­ed an unbridge­able gap between the Baloch and Islam­abad. An author­i­tar­i­an polit­i­cal sys­tem (or lack of provin­cial auton­o­my), lack of infra­struc­tur­al devel­op­ment, absence of socio-eco­nom­ic oppor­tu­ni­ties, bad gov­er­nance and dis­crim­i­na­to­ry eco­nom­ic poli­cies have stoked feel­ings of depri­va­tion among Baloch peo­ple, mak­ing them poten­tial recruits for any gueril­la strug­gle against Islam­abad. In addi­tion to Islamabad’s pol­i­cy of neglect, the self­ish and cor­rupt polit­i­cal elite of Balochis­tan, along with tra­di­tion­al author­i­ta­tive sar­dars, are also respon­si­ble for the sor­ry state of affairs. On numer­ous occa­sions these trib­al sar­dars had the chance to gov­ern, but pro­duced lit­tle change.

The cur­rent con­flict, which start­ed in 2004 as a result of the arbi­trary poli­cies of Gen­er­al Mushar­raf and cul­mi­nat­ed in the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti, is again a tes­ti­mo­ny to Islamabad’s flawed approach towards Balochis­tan. Bugti and oth­er nation­al­ists voiced their con­cerns regard­ing ‘mega projects’ in Balochis­tan announced by Musharraf’s gov­ern­ment and vowed to stand up against any devel­op­ment launched with­out the approval of the Baloch. Not learn­ing from the mis­takes of his pre­de­ces­sors, Mushar­raf, instead of address­ing Baloch griev­ances polit­i­cal­ly and through nego­ti­a­tions, adopt­ed an aggres­sive pos­ture that added fuel to the fire. By killing Bugti — one of those few sar­dars who vot­ed to join Pak­istan in 1947 and who favoured fed­er­a­tion — Mushar­raf com­mit­ted a great polit­i­cal blun­der as the inci­dent sparked an unprece­dent­ed wave of anti-Pak­istan sen­ti­ments that pro­vid­ed great impe­tus to the Baloch insur­gency and the nation­al­ist cause. The new cadre of the Baloch nation­al­ist youth is more rigid and rad­i­cal in its approach. While Bugti was will­ing to nego­ti­ate with the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment, his young and rad­i­cal fol­low­ers spurn dia­logue and coex­is­tence with the fed­er­a­tion.

Bugti’s death, com­bined with the issue of miss­ing per­sons in Balochis­tan, has result­ed in the unfor­tu­nate tar­get killings of set­tlers – main­ly Pun­jabi work­ers and teach­ers – and attacks on gov­ern­ment per­son­nel, build­ings and instal­la­tions. The killing of Pun­jabi teach­ers, alleged­ly by Bloch insur­gents, has not only caused sub­stan­tial eco­nom­ic and polit­i­cal dam­age but has also caused great set­backs to the edu­ca­tion­al sys­tem in the province, already the worst in Pak­istan. In the wake of tar­get­ed killings, a con­sid­er­able num­ber of qual­i­fied teach­ers, fear­ing for their safe­ty, have either left the province or demand­ed their relo­ca­tion to schools in Pash­tun-dom­i­nat­ed dis­tricts of Balochis­tan where the law and order sit­u­a­tion is rel­a­tive­ly bet­ter. Insur­gents view schools as rep­re­sen­ta­tives of the Pak­istani state and sym­bols of mil­i­tary oppres­sion.

It is worth not­ing that the vic­tims of tar­get killings are peo­ple who set­tled in the province long ago and have almost inte­grat­ed them­selves into the socio-cul­tur­al, eco­nom­ic and polit­i­cal fab­ric of the province. These peo­ple have noth­ing to do with the state and its mil­i­tary estab­lish­ment against whom the Baloch anger is direct­ed and such killings have evoked con­dem­na­tion from almost all the polit­i­cal forces in the province, includ­ing Sar­dar Attaullah Men­gal, a vet­er­an Baloch Nation­al­ist leader, who in an inter­view with the BBC renounced the use of vio­lence to achieve polit­i­cal goals.

The state’s response to the sit­u­a­tion has been ter­ri­ble. Secu­ri­ty agen­cies, instead of improv­ing the law and order sit­u­a­tion and pro­vid­ing secu­ri­ty to the set­tlers, have respond­ed with abduc­tion and extra-judi­cial killings of Baloch polit­i­cal work­ers and activists, dete­ri­o­rat­ing the sit­u­a­tion fur­ther. In a recent and more wor­ry­ing trend, muti­lat­ed and decom­posed bod­ies of abduct­ed Baloch youth and polit­i­cal activists have start­ed turn­ing up along roads in des­o­late places. Por­tray­ing an ‘extreme­ly pre­car­i­ous’ pic­ture of the sit­u­a­tion in Balochis­tan, the Human Rights Com­mis­sion of Pak­istan (HRCP) report­ed that at least 140 bod­ies of miss­ing per­sons have been found in the last 11 months and that there is cred­i­ble evi­dence that secu­ri­ty forces are involved. The com­mis­sion also said that all the author­i­ty in the province seems to rest with the secu­ri­ty forces, who enjoy com­plete impuni­ty, where­as the civ­il admin­is­tra­tion, which is meant to rep­re­sent the peo­ple, appears to have ced­ed its pow­ers.

The PPP gov­ern­ment was off to a pos­i­tive start when it extend­ed apolo­gies to the Baloch peo­ple for past injus­tices, but it could do lit­tle more than make emp­ty promis­es to resolve the issue. Nev­er­the­less, the pass­ing of the Nation­al Finance Com­mis­sion Award and the abo­li­tion of the con­cur­rent list through the 18th amend­ment were some com­mend­able steps tak­en by the PPP gov­ern­ment. The adop­tion of the 18th amend­ment was a great suc­cess in par­tic­u­lar as it set­tled the issue of provin­cial auton­o­my to the sat­is­fac­tion of all stake­hold­ers. But these steps have done lit­tle to improve the sit­u­a­tion in the province — the use of force con­tin­ues to be the pre­ferred approach in deal­ing with the insur­gency. There has been lit­tle improve­ment in the lives of ordi­nary peo­ple. The provin­cial gov­ern­ment is cor­rupt. Most impor­tant­ly, it is sub­servient to mil­i­tary author­i­ties in the province and, there­fore, has no man­date to talk to the insur­gents or the aggriev­ed nation­al­ist lead­ers. The much-hyped Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochis­tan pack­age has also been a dis­ap­point­ment as the gov­ern­ment has only been able to imple­ment 15 of its 61 pro­pos­als.

Giv­en the grim sit­u­a­tion, only a gen­uine attempt can bring an end to the tur­moil. The gov­ern­ment must focus on win­ning the hearts and minds of the trau­ma­tized Baloch mass­es. All pos­si­ble efforts should be made to make the province’s dis­il­lu­sioned nation­al­ist lead­ers a part of the main­stream polit­i­cal spec­trum; the issue of miss­ing per­sons should be solved on an urgent basis; and the secu­ri­ty forces oper­at­ing in the province should be brought under civil­ian con­trol. Fur­ther­more, the pow­ers of the Sen­ate should be enhanced to ensure the real essence of fed­er­al­ism while the con­cerns of the Baloch regard­ing their nat­ur­al resources and the mega-projects must be addressed as well. A clear and com­pre­hen­sive roadmap should be pro­vid­ed for the socio-eco­nom­ic devel­op­ment of the area before it is too late.