Laaltain

The Trouble with Our Borders

31 اکتوبر، 2014

Just as the inter­nal polit­i­cal cri­sis has begun to sub­side, anoth­er cri­sis in the form of ten­sion along bor­ders has arisen. On the east­ern bor­der, vio­lence has esca­lat­ed along the Line of Con­trol and the work­ing bound­ary since the clash­es first erupt­ed on Oct 2, result­ing in the loss of lives and dis­place­ment of pop­u­la­tion on both sides. Both coun­tries accuse each oth­er of trig­ger­ing the lat­est round of hos­til­i­ties. On the west­ern front, fric­tion along the Pak-Afghan bor­der has become a near con­stant over the past decade. More recent­ly, ten­sion along Pakistan’s bor­der with Iran has also mount­ed. The lat­est ten­sion was pre­cip­i­tat­ed by the killing of four Iran­ian secu­ri­ty per­son­nel by Jaish-ul Adl, an eth­nic Baloch and Sun­ni group that claims to fight for the rights of the peo­ple of the Ses­tan-Balochis­tan province of Iran and is thought to be based in Pakistan’s Balochis­tan. Ear­li­er this year in Feb­ru­ary, the Jaish abduct­ed 5 Iran­ian bor­der guards and report­ed­ly took them across the bor­der into Pak­istan. One of the sol­diers was alleged­ly exe­cut­ed and four were sub­se­quent­ly released after months of acri­mo­nious nego­ti­a­tions. Iran­ian author­i­ties repeat­ed­ly warned Islam­abad and vowed to act uni­lat­er­al­ly if the cross-bor­der ter­ror­ist activ­i­ty did not cease. A week ago, the Iran­ian guards did car­ry out the pledge when they report­ed­ly raid­ed a vil­lage inside Pakistan’s ter­ri­to­ry, result­ing in the loss of one Pak­istani Fron­tier Corps sol­dier.

The fun­da­men­tal prob­lem is that rebels and mil­i­tants of all neigh­bour­ing states have found sanc­tu­ar­ies in Pak­istan and are using its soil to launch cross-bor­der attacks.

Unfor­tu­nate­ly the com­mon denom­i­na­tor in the ten­sion along all three bor­ders is the cross-bor­der ter­ror­ism. As of now, the only osten­si­bly calm bor­der is that with Chi­na. But even Chi­na is frus­trat­ed with Islamabad’s con­tin­u­ing fail­ure to curb ter­ror­ist groups with­in its ter­ri­to­ries. Chi­na has time and again con­veyed its con­cerns to Islam­abad about the sanc­tu­ary of Uighur Islam­ic mil­i­tants inside Pak­istan. The only dif­fer­ence is that, unlike the India, Iran and Afghanistan, Chi­na does not want to embar­rass Pak­istan and there­fore refrains from crit­i­ciz­ing it pub­licly. Now, what do we make of this sit­u­a­tion? Is this anoth­er “grand con­spir­a­cy” against Pak­istan? Or is there some­thing seri­ous­ly wrong with­in our house?

The fun­da­men­tal prob­lem is that rebels and mil­i­tants of all neigh­bour­ing states have found sanc­tu­ar­ies in Pak­istan and are using its soil to launch cross-bor­der attacks. One may argue that the writ of the state has grad­u­al­ly weak­ened in Balochis­tan and FATA, and the mil­i­tants are exploit­ing this weak­ness. But then one has to ask the ques­tion if the Pak­istani state has real­ly done its best to enforce the writ of the state in the first place. Unfor­tu­nate­ly, the answer is no. Not only is the Pak­istani state not doing enough to curb ter­ror­ism ema­nat­ing from its soil but is also accused by many, at home and abroad, of being a spon­sor of some, if not all, mil­i­tant groups. The Pak­istani state, the argu­ment goes on, is still using Islam­ic mil­i­tan­cy as a means of achiev­ing its region­al geo-polit­i­cal goals. Unfor­tu­nate­ly, this view­point is not entire­ly inac­cu­rate. There is no deny­ing that sup­port to Islam­ic mil­i­tants has remained a cen­tral plank of Islamabad’s India and Afghan pol­i­cy. Nev­er­the­less, the counter-argu­ment that Islam­abad no longer has con­trol over all mil­i­tant groups is also not false. There­fore, every cross-bor­der mil­i­tant activ­i­ty should not be viewed as Islamabad’s pol­i­cy. For instance, it is safe to argue that Islam­abad is gen­uine­ly com­mit­ted to erad­i­cate the safe havens of the East Turkestan Islam­ic Move­ment (ETIM) in the trib­al areas. In case of Iran, it is unclear as to whether Pakistan’s fail­ure to stem cross-bor­der mil­i­tant move­ment is due to lack of will or capac­i­ty. How­ev­er, it can be said for sure that there has been a pal­pa­ble and alarm­ing increase in the influ­ence of sec­tar­i­an out­fits in Balochis­tan over the past few years. The state at best seems to have turned a blind eye to their activ­i­ties. It is wide­ly believed that the state is using these groups to neu­tralise and sup­press Baloch nation­al­ist move­ment. Besides, some crit­ics believe that Islamabad’s align­ment with Saudi’s region­al agen­da also explains its indif­fer­ent behav­iour towards Iran­ian con­cerns about cross-bor­der ter­ror­ism.

Durable peace can only be achieved if Islam­abad brings a strate­gic shift in its pol­i­cy towards non-state mil­i­tant groups and restores the state’s monop­oly over vio­lence.

The under­ly­ing root cause of the above cri­sis is that a pol­i­cy of dis­tinc­tion between the so-called good and bad mil­i­tants is still in place. This pol­i­cy is not only hurt­ing our region­al inter­ests but also seri­ous­ly thwart­ing domes­tic efforts for the restora­tion of peace. It is because of this pol­i­cy that despite los­ing more than 50,000 lives and suf­fer­ing eco­nom­ic loss worth $100 bil­lion in the ‘war on ter­ror’, Pak­istan is still being accused of not doing enough to curb ter­ror­ism. This pol­i­cy is act­ing like a dou­ble jeop­ardy for ordi­nary Pak­ista­nis who, despite hav­ing suf­fered the most at the hands of ter­ror­ism at home, have to face dis­crim­i­na­to­ry atti­tude out­side the coun­try for being poten­tial sus­pects or sup­port­ers of ter­ror­ism. Most impor­tant­ly, the same good mil­i­tants have assist­ed the bad mil­i­tants in killing thou­sands of Pak­ista­nis by pro­vid­ing them oper­a­tional, logis­ti­cal and ide­o­log­i­cal sup­port. Due to the same pol­i­cy, the moral sup­port for and legit­i­ma­cy of the Kash­mir cause has declined inter­na­tion­al­ly. Today, this pol­i­cy has inten­si­fied Pakistan’s iso­la­tion in the world and has the poten­tial to cre­ate much more seri­ous prob­lems for us. For instance, any rep­e­ti­tion of the Mum­bai style ter­ror attacks would plunge the region into a poten­tial­ly dis­as­trous cri­sis. And to make things even worse, no one in the rest of the world will stand by our side.

Pak­istan has to rein in the mil­i­tant groups with­in its bor­ders if it wants to achieve inter­nal and exter­nal peace. Owing to the com­plex region­al secu­ri­ty ter­rain, Pak­istan can­not estab­lish inter­nal peace unless it con­tributes to peace in the neigh­bour­ing coun­tries. Our efforts for inter­nal peace, there­fore, must coin­cide with ini­tia­tives for region­al peace. Durable peace can only be achieved if Islam­abad brings a strate­gic shift in its pol­i­cy towards non-state mil­i­tant groups and restores the state’s monop­oly over vio­lence. Such mea­sures will help Islam­abad mend its strained ties with Kab­ul, New Del­hi, Tehran and Wash­ing­ton and seek their sup­port in root­ing out ter­ror­ism.
Pak­istan can­not afford to remain on the wrong side of his­to­ry for­ev­er. On the issue of ter­ror­ism, it is not Pak­istan vs India, Pak­istan vs Afghanistan or Pak­istan vs Tehran. It is Pak­istan vs the rest of the world. The soon­er we realise it the bet­ter it is.

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